2d 611 (1993).

"[I]n the context of a vexatious suit action, the defendant lacks probable cause if he lacks a reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and the validity of the claim asserted." (h).). Corp. v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. "Courts in this district have held that personal jurisdiction over a director or officer must be based on conduct apart from acts in the director or officer's official capacity." See id. 1366, 1374-75 (D.Conn.) On October 10, 1996, Masquelier assigned to INC "whatever rights, if any, he had in the '360 patent that reverted to him from Horphag." (e)(1)) or ‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review (id., subd. For the reasons stated above, the defendants motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (document no.

When a ‘ “complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited” ‘ [citation], it is not subject to being stricken as a SLAPP.” (Ibid. Id. ), Jarrow also argues that the legislative history materials contain no evidence the Legislature ever considered applying the statute to malicious prosecution claims. 12, ante.) By contrast, section 425.16 was “based on the need to ‘screen out meritless cases at an early stage. Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 407 A.2d 982, 985 (1978).

Jarrow argues that because the Sherman Antitrust Act authorizes worldwide service of process, the court should look to Schwitters and Masquelier's aggregate contacts with the United States to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. The judge also dismissed all potential class members from the action without prejudice.

Zivin argues for the first time in the defendants' reply memorandum that "[a]ll claims against [him] fail to state a claim for relief" because "Plaintiff states no facts which implicate [him] in any unlawful conduct [and] ... [Zivin] is accused in the Complaint only of filing lawsuits on INC's behalf and recording patent assignments in the PTO on INC's behalf. The defendants first argue that Jarrow's causes of action are barred because they are compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised during the prior patent infringement litigation. this organization. (noting that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir.1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Couldock & Bohan, Inc. v. Societe Generale Securities Corp., 93 F. Supp. As we previously have observed, “[n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703.). As to the second element, however, the defendants argue that because "the prior case was decided on procedural grounds, ... there was no disposition in Jarrow's favor on the merits." "On March 25, 1997, the French trial court declared the 1994 Assignment to INC void ab initio because SCIPA could not assign its interest in the '360 patent to INC without offering Horphag a right of first refusal." Since Jarrow's summary judgment motion was granted in the prior patent litigation in the district court and the district court's decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, the defendants' argument is without merit. In Suburban Restoration Co. v. ACMAT Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1983), the court held that "the activity complained of ...the filing of a single non-sham lawsuitcannot *312 form the basis of a claim under CUTPA." Nevertheless, we may observe that available legislative history buttresses a plain language construction. "In addition, the court must draw inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." "Dismissal is not warranted unless `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims which would entitle [it] to relief.'" (b)); hence, for the same reasons malicious prosecution claims are exempt from application of the litigation privilege, we should exempt them from the anti-SLAPP statute. Co., Inc., 964 F. Supp. By “pre-screening” mechanisms, Jarrow apparently refers to the elements of the malicious prosecution tort itself, and in particular to the element of lack of probable cause. Finally, Jarrow argues that affirmance will result in elimination of the malicious prosecution tort, thereby giving a “green light to parties and counsel” to bring meritless actions and rendering unscrupulous litigators and attorneys “exempt from any accountability for their acts.” Not so. Based upon the allegations set forth in the complaint, it is clear that Masquelier has the minimum contacts necessary for the court to assert jurisdiction over him. “Courts deciding anti-SLAPP motions, for example, are empowered to mitigate their impact by ordering, where appropriate, ‘that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding’ the motion’s pendency. Eastern R.R. Even if Schwitters was involved in the decision to file the patent litigation, this would still not be a tortious act committed in Connecticut. [FN 5].

Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566-67 (2d Cir.

Since the motion to dismiss standard is much lower than the summary judgment motion standard, the application of this two-part definition in this case will vary from the Court's application in Professional Real Estate Investors. The defendants do not dispute that the complaint properly asserts facts to establish the first element of the cause of action. 70, 72 (D.Conn.1997) (citing McHale v. W.B.S. 1239, § 1, p. 7106; Stats.1997, ch. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., §§ 35-24 to -46[2] (the Connecticut Antitrust Act), Conn. Gen.Stat. United States Surgical Corp. v. Imagyn Medical Technologies, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 850, 856 (D.Mass.1986). Conmed Corp. v. ERBE Electromedizin GmbH, 129 F. Supp. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Sept.19, 2000) (quoting PDK Labs Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir.1997)); see also United States Surgical Corp. v. Imagyn Med. Protected by Google ReCAPTCHA. Our primary task in construing a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent. [4] Section 1125(a) (1) of Title 15 of the United States Code provides that: [a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act. 2d 626 (1965); E. R.R. [7] Jarrow cites to 15 U.S.C. 31, 35 (D.Conn.1993) ("The crucial factor is whether the plaintiff suffered direct economic injury within Connecticut. See Complaint ¶¶ 9, 17, 18, 23, 27, 33, 38. (See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1123, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564 [same with respect to “public interest” limitation]. 506, 511-513 (documenting six types of SLAPP’s that “appeared most frequently” in the authors’ study, including “judicial process abuse”). Serv. In addition, even if the complaint's allegations were sufficient to establish injury in Connecticut, the complaint does not sufficiently allege either that third or fourth factors of this provision have been satisfied. [FN 4] The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1992 (Stats.1992, ch. at 99-100. The only allegations as to the misrepresentations are too vague to make even a prima facie showing of a tortious act in Connecticut.[9]. That definition, which is found in subdivision (e) of the statute, places within section 425.16’s purview “any written … statement or writing made before a … judicial proceeding,” “any written … statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a … judicial body,” and “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd. § 22 and the nationwide contacts approach do not apply.

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